

Message Text

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SUBJECT: US POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE

FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS RELATING TO YUGOSLAVIA FROM COUNSELOR SONNENFELDT'S TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ON APRIL 12, 1976. CONGRESSMAN CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE PRESIDED. (TEXT STILL SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTIONS.)

1. MR. LAGOMARSINO. YOU MENTIONED THAT ANY SHIFT THAT PUT YUGOSLAVIA BACK IN THE SOVIET ORBIT WOULD REPRESENT A MAJOR SETBACK FOR US, AND I CERTAINLY AGREE WITH THAT, BUT WHAT RANGE OF POLICIES MIGHT WE CONSIDER IN THE EVENT THAT THIS SHOULD BEGIN TO OCCUR?

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MR. SONNENFELDT. WELL AGAIN, SIR, YOU ARE ASKING ME TO DEAL WITH A PARTICULAR CONTINGENCY OR CONTINGENCIES. OUR POSTURE WITH RESPECT TO YUGOSLAVIA HAS BEEN TO ASSIST THAT COUNTRY IN MAINTAINING ITS INDEPENDENCE.

WE HAVE MANY RELATIONSHIPS IN MANY AREAS WITH YUGOSLAVIA. TWO PRESIDENTS HAVE BEEN THERE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS BEEN THERE. AND INNUMERABLE CABINET OFFICERS HAVE BEEN

THERE. YUGOSLAV LEADERS HAVE BEEN IN THIS COUNTRY.

WE WOULD EXPECT TO PURSUE THOSE POLICY LINES FOR AS LONG AHEAD AS ANYONE CAN SEE, AND WE WOULD HOPE THAT THAT WOULD HELP UNDERPIN THE INDEPENDENCE OF YUGOSLAVIA IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, AND WE CERTAINLY DO BELIEVE THAT YUGOSLAV INDEPENDENCE IS A MAJOR INTEREST OF OURS AND A MAJOR INTEREST OF MANY OF THE ADJACENT COUNTRIES IN EUROPE AND CERTAINLY A MAJOR INTEREST OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE THEMSELVES.

WE WILL DO AND PURSUE THE LINES OF POLICY NOW AND SUBSEQUENTLY, IN WHATEVER CIRCUMSTANCES, THAT I HAVE OUTLINED TO YOU JUST NOW.

MR. LAGOMARSINO. WHEN A NUMBER OF US WERE IN YUGOSLAVIA IN JANUARY, SOME OF THE LEADERSHIP THERE EXPRESSED THE CONCERN TO US ABOUT WHAT THEY SAW DETENTE AS BEING, AND THEY POINTED OUT THAT THEY FELT THAT DETENTE WAS PRETTY MUCH A SITUATION WHERE THE TWO SUPERPOWERS WERE GOING TO HAVE PERHAPS AN ARMS TRUCE BETWEEN THEM, BUT THAT EVERYBODY ELSE WOULD HAVE TO BE LEFT ON THEIR OWN.

SO, WITH THAT IN MIND, IS IT POSSIBLE THAT YOUR OWN REMARKS ABOUT OUR INTEREST IN HELPING THE RUSSIANS SOLIDIFY THEIR RULE MIGHT ACTUALLY MAKE THIS EVENT MORE LIKELY, OR, I SHOULD SAY, THE MISINTERPRETATION OF YOUR REMARKS.

MR. SONNENFELDT. TO BE VERY CLEAR, THERE ARE NO REMARKS OF MINE THAT HAVE EVEN A WHIFF OF AN IMPLICATION THAT WE SHOULD HELP THE RUSSIANS SOLIDIFY THEIR RULE.

I THINK IT IS TRUE THAT THERE HAVE BEEN CONCERNS IN YUGO-
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SLAVIA, BUT ALSO ELSEWHERE, THAT THE EFFORT TO NORMALIZE AND STABILIZE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION REPRESENTS SOME SORT OF CONDOMINIUM THAT IS CONDUCTED OVER THE HEADS OR BEHIND THE BACKS OF OTHERS.

THAT IS A WRONG PERCEPTION. IT IS NOT SO, AND EVERYTHING I HAVE SAID HERE AND EVERYTHING THAT HAS BEEN SAID OVER AND OVER AGAIN INDICATES THAT THAT IS NOT SO. THAT IS WHY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES WENT TO THOSE COUNTRIES. THAT IS WHY THEIR LEADERS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED HERE. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE DIVERSIFIED OUR CONTACTS AND RELATIONSHIPS IN A WHOLE VARIETY OF AREAS, TO MAKE VERY CLEAR THAT THE KIND OF INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE THAT WE WANT TO WORK FOR IS

ONE IN WHICH ALL HAVE A STAKE.

IT IS TRUE THAT, AS POWERS WITH ENORMOUS CAPACITY FOR

DESTRUCTION AT OUR DISPOSAL, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO ASSURE THAT CONFLICTS DO NOT RUN OUT OF CONTROL AND THAT COMPETITION DOES NOT BECOME SO VIRULENT THAT A CATASTROPHIC WAR WILL OCCUR. THAT IS INDEED A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY.

BUT THERE IS NOT IN THAT ANY IMPLICATION THAT WE AND THE SOVIET UNION IN SOME WAY DICTATE TO OTHERS. ON THE CONTRARY, OUR WHOLE CONCEPT, OUR WHOLE SYSTEM OF VALUES, HAS TO DO WITH THE SHARING OF THE BENEFITS OF A MORE PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS WORLD ORDER, AND WE COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE INVOLVED IN POLICIES THAT ARE CONDUCTED OVER THE HEADS OF OTHERS AND THAT SOMEHOW MAKE THEM PAWNS ON A BIG CHESSBOARD.

THAT IS NOT AMERICAN POLICY AND HAS NOT BEEN AMERICAN POLICY AND WILL NOT BE AMERICAN POLICY, I AM QUITE CONFIDENT.

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2. MR. DERWINSKI. I HAVE A SPECIFIC QUESTION. OUR OCCASIONAL CONTACTS WITH THE OFFICIALS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA -- WHEN I SAY "OUR" CONTACTS, OUR CONGRESSIONAL CONTACTS, JOURNALISTS, AMERICANS TRAVELING THERE -- THEY UNCLASSIFIED

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INEVITABLY INCLUDE IN THEIR LECTURE ON FOREIGN POLICY THE PREDICTION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE DIRECT DESIGNS ON POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA. THEY GO SO FAR AS TO SUGGEST THAT THEY WOULD USE FORCE IF NECESSARY TO GET CONTROL OF YUGOSLAVIA.

WHAT ASSESSMENT DO YOU AND THE SECRETARY HAVE ON THAT VERY DIRECT AND LESS THAN SUBTLE ANALYSIS BY THE RED CHINESE?

MR. SONNENFELDT. WELL, WHAT YOU HAVE REPORTED THERE, MR. DERWINSKI, IS A CONCERN THAT MANY HAVE. IT IS SOMETHING THAT WE WORRY ABOUT AND THINK ABOUT. WE HAVE NOT REACHED ANY FIRM CONCLUSION, AS ONE CANNOT. YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT THE UNKNOWN FUTURE, AS TO PRECISELY WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN YUGOSLAVIA OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS WHEN CHANGES OCCUR, AS THEY INEVITABLY WILL, IN THE LEADERSHIP THERE.

OUR INTERESTS ARE CLEAR, AND I STATED THEM HERE EARLIER, AND THEY WERE REFLECTED ALSO IN THE MATERIAL THAT APPEARED IN THE NEW YORK TIMES AND INDEED THEY FORM ONE OF THE KEY PREMISES OF AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA.

OUR INTEREST IN THE INDEPENDENCE OF YUGOSLAVIA IS CLEAR,

AND WE WILL DO WHAT WE CAN TO BUTTRESS THAT, BUT THERE IS A CONCERN. WE HAVE THAT. WE WORRY ABOUT IT. AND THAT IS ABOUT AS FAR AS I CAN GO ON THAT. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT THESE DIRE CONTINGENCIES WILL NEVER COME ABOUT.

AS I SAY, WE WILL CERTAINLY CONDUCT OUR POLICIES NOW AND IN THE FUTURE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO GIVE THE STRONGEST AND MOST CONSTRUCTIVE POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO YUGOSLAV WELL-BEING AND INDEPENDENCE. ...

3. MR. FINDLEY. I HAVE SEVERAL MORE QUESTIONS WHICH I HOPE WILL HELP TO LAY THIS TO REST. FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD LIKE TO HAVE APPROVAL OF THE CONGRESS IN ORDER TO SUPPLY SOME MILITARY SPARE PARTS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT TO YUGOSLAVIA. THAT WOULD NOT SEEM TO ME TO BE A STEP CALCULATED TO ENHANCE THE UNCLASSIFIED

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PROSPECT OF SOVIET DOMINATION OVER YUGOSLAVIA. WOULD YOU AGREE?

MR. SONNENFELDT. YES, SIR. AND WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THAT APPROVAL, AND I THINK WE SHOULD PROCEED WITH THOSE PROGRAMS.

...

4. MR. ZABLOCKI. JUST SO IT WOULD NOT BE -- APPEAR THAT I HAVE LESS REGARD AND RESPECT FOR OUR SECRETARY OF STATE, SINCE MY COLLEAGUE FROM ILLINOIS HAS QUOTED HIM AS ONE OF HIS FAVORITE AUTHORS, HE IS MINE AS WELL. SECRETARY KISSINGER HAS TAKEN THE POSITION IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER SITUATIONS THAT TERRITORY IS RELATIVELY INSIGNIFICANT FOR THE PRESERVATION OF SECURITY IN THE AGE OF BALLISTIC MISSILES. I MUST ASK A QUESTION. WHY IS THE CONTINUED ABSORPTION OF ALL OF EASTERN EUROPE NECESSARY FOR SOVIET SECURITY? THERE CAN BE A COMMUNIST COUNTRY, CUBA, 90 MILES FROM THE UNITED STATES. WHY NOT A RELATIVELY INDEPENDENT YUGOSLAVIA 900 MILES FROM THE SOVIET UNION OR ANY OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DESIRING SELF-DETERMINATION AND PARTICULARLY SELF -- THEIR NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THEIR INTERNATIONAL POLICIES?

MR. SONNENFELDT. WELL, MR. CHAIRMAN, I AM NOT SURE WHAT VINTAGE KISSINGER YOU ARE QUOTING. --- (LAUGHTER.) --- IN THAT PARTICULAR INSTANCE.

MR. ZABLOCKI. THE OLDER THE VINTAGE, THEY SAY, THE BETTER THE QUOTE.

MR. SONNENFELDT. IN ANY EVENT, I AGREE WITH YOU. I THINK

THAT -- I AM NOT HERE TO TELL THE SOVIET UNION HOW TO JUDGE

ITS OWN SECURITY, BUT, AS AN OBSERVER OF THE SITUATION,
I AGREE WITH YOU. I THINK THAT EVERYONE'S SECURITY ---

MR. ZABLOCKI. YOU AGREE WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER?

MR. SONNENFELDT. FIRST OF ALL, I AGREE WITH YOU, SIR,
THAT EVERYONE'S SECURITY, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION'S
SECURITY, WOULD BE SATISFIED BY A SITUATION IN EASTERN AND
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CENTRAL EUROPE WHERE THE COUNTRIES THERE WERE INDEPENDENT
AND FRIENDLY WITH EVERYONE. THAT, I THINK, IS CONSISTENT
WITH SECURITY.

THERE IS A MORE GENERAL POINT. I DON'T WANT TO DELAY YOU,
BUT A POINT WHICH THE SECRETARY HAS STRESSED RECENTLY WHICH
I THINK WE NEED TO BEAR IN MIND. WE HAVE REACHED A CON-
DITION OF ESSENTIAL STRATEGIC PARITY BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

I THINK IN THAT SITUATION, AS WAS PREDICTED MANY YEARS AGO,
WHEN SUCH A POSSIBILITY WAS CONCEIVED OF, REGIONAL POWER
BALANCES AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS ASSUME A VERY GREAT IMPORT-
ANCE, AND, THEREFORE, I WOULD NOT NECESSARILY AGREE THAT
TERRITORY, IF YOU MEAN BY THAT WHAT HAPPENS IN PARTICULAR
REGIONS OF THE WORLD, HAS LOST ITS IMPORTANCE.

I THINK WE DO HAVE TO BE VERY CAREFUL THAT, WHEN WE TALK OF
MAINTAINING A POWER BALANCE, WHEN WE TALK OF RESTRAINT,
WHEN WE TALK OF RELATIONSHIPS BASED ON RESTRAINT, THAT WE
DO NOT PERMIT EVEN SMALL SHIFTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL BAL-
ANCE IN ONE REGION OR ANOTHER TO OCCUR BECAUSE CUMULATIVELY
THOSE SHIFTS COULD AFFECT OUR INTERESTS AND OUR POSITION.

THAT IS ONE OF THE ISSUES AT PLAY IN THE ANGOLA MATTER,
AND, THEREFORE, I WOULD SAY IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH
WE NOW FIND OURSELVES AND WILL FIND OURSELVES IN MANY, MANY,
MANY YEARS TO COME, WE DO HAVE TO GIVE VERY SUBSTANTIAL
ATTENTION TO OUR CAPACITY, MILITARY CAPACITY, TO DEAL WITH
REGIONAL CONFLICTS.

THEREFORE, I WOULD NOT NOW SUBSCRIBE TO THE NOTION THAT
TERRITORY PER SE HAS LOST ITS SIGNIFICANCE. KISSINGER

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